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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY Poland REPORT
SUBJECT 1. Reactions to Western Propaganda, and Political Attitudes
2. Economic Planning, Wages and Working Morale DATE DISTR. 21 June 1955
NO. OF PAGES 8
DATE OF INFO. 50X1 REQUIREMENT NO. RD
PLACE ACQUIRED REFERENCES
DATE ACQUIRED 50X1

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SOURCE:

[Redacted Source Information]

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STATE	#X	ARMY	#X	NAVY	#X	AIR	#X	FBI		AEC						
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(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Radio Listening Habits:

1. Source listened to the radio nearly every evening, usually to the BBC German-language news broadcast on the short-wave band at eight o'clock Polish time. He had formerly listened to RIAS, but since the summer of 1954 the jamming had been so heavy that he could no longer hear it. VOA was also so heavily jammed that he rarely heard it. Although he spoke excellent Polish, he did not usually listen to Polish-language news broadcasts. The Communist broadcasts did not interest him, and the Polish-language transmissions from the West were generally too jammed to be heard well. Nevertheless, whenever something of particular interest such as a Great Powers' conference was taking place, he often got up early in the morning to tune in RFE's Polish broadcasts. RFE was very heavily jammed at night, but could be heard well enough from five to seven each morning. He thought this was because the Communist monitors chose this time to record what was being broadcast from the West. It was also his experience that jamming of RFE was often fairly light on Sunday mornings. The West German middle-wave stations were jammed in Poland, but could generally be heard well enough late in the evening.
2. Source occasionally heard Polish-language short-wave broadcasts from Ankara and Paris, but did not care for them as they gave too little news of Poland. He also sometimes heard Polish-language broadcasts from Madrid on the short-wave band. The transmissions from Madrid were heavily jammed, but were fairly popular in Poland (at least he liked them) because Madrid often criticized the weakness of the western governments' policies toward the USSR.

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3. Source had no particular criticisms to make about the contents of western broadcasts. He did say, however, that reports of strikes in the western countries generally had an anti-Communist effect in Poland, despite the fact that the Communists often pretended that the strikers were led by western Communists. When workers in Poland heard of strikes in the West, they asked themselves, "Why can't we strike too to better our lives?"

Reactions to Defection of Swiatlo:

4. Source never talked about Swiatlo's defection with Party members, but he was certain that the defection caused great satisfaction to nearly everyone in Poland. For a few days after the escape was announced, there were many more smiling faces to be seen in Poland than for a long time, though the smiles were more ones of Schadenfreude at the embarrassment of the Communists than of real happiness. Source supposed that the later removal of the Minister of State Security was probably a result of Swiatlo's escape. He did not think, however, that such shake-ups of government offices had much effect on peoples' political outlook. Since regular purges were seen as an inherent feature of Communist rule, an occasional reorganization of even a key office was not taken as any sign that life would be either better or worse in the future.
5. Source read Swiatlo's booklet, "Za Kulisami Bezpieki i Partii" [redacted] 50X1
He was enthusiastic in his praise of it. Everything in it rang completely true. It was in every respect a masterpiece of its kind. He could think of nothing in it which should have been left out. The only suggestion he made was that people in the provinces would also have been greatly interested in reading of cases of the abuse of power by local police officials, though he supposed that details of such cases might actually not be known to officials in Warsaw.

Political Attitudes in Upper Silesia:

5. Source said that there were probably not more than five per cent convinced Communists among the present population of Upper Silesia. The overwhelming majority of both Poles and ethnic Germans there was strongly anti-Communist. He did not believe that the Communists were gaining followers, except possibly among the very young, but this did not mean that pro-western attitudes were remaining unchanged. In his view, there had been a great growth of political passivity in recent years, what source called an Abstumpfung of political interests. People were so depressed by the hopelessness of their situation that they had lost interest and faith in the West and in America. Source traced this deadening of interests particularly to the widespread disillusionment in Poland after the election of President Eisenhower. Many people in Poland had thought that the victory of the Republican administration would somehow bring their liberation nearer. When they saw that this was not the case, their despair was even greater than it had been before.

- Though the above remarks applied to the attitudes of both Poles and ethnic Germans, source, [redacted] 50X1
[redacted] was best able to talk about the political views of the native Upper Silesians. It was his opinion, that the question of German-Polish relations in Upper Silesia, after Communism had been overthrown, would best be solved by a plebiscite of native Upper Silesians. He thought post-war Polish immigrants should be excluded from the voting. The plebiscite could then determine whether the natives wished the territory to remain a part of Poland, to be given to Germany, or to become an independent political entity like Switzerland. In the present state of Upper Silesian political opinion, he thought that such a plebiscite would show about 60 per cent of the vote for independence, from 20 to 30 per cent for union with Germany, and not more than five or ten per cent for continuation of the Polish connection. If the native Silesian voters had to choose only between Poland or Germany, however, he estimated that 90 per cent would favor union with Germany.

Source said that relations between the German-speaking (he would call them Silesian-speaking) inhabitants of Upper Silesia and the Poles were not as bad now as they were in the first years after the war. This was because some of the discrimination against

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the native Silesians, which had been a feature of the first post-war years, had been done away with. Nevertheless, the authorities still favored the Poles in the allocation of office jobs. In the [redacted] for example, four-fifths of the approximately 7,000 manual workers were native Silesians but fewer than a quarter of the 1,300 or more office workers were native Silesians.

9. Source did not know what proportion of the present population of Upper Silesia consisted of post-war Polish immigrants. He believed that in the villages and on the farms practically all of the inhabitants were natives, but the cities were largely Polish. Probably, therefore, there were now more Poles in Upper Silesia than native Silesians. Source believed that if Communism were overthrown, most of these Poles would voluntarily choose to return to central Poland or to the territory which might be regained from the Soviet Union. As evidence of this, he cited the appearance in Polish newspapers, at times when international tension is particularly high, of advertisements offering to exchange, for example, a villa in Wroclaw for a flat in Krakow. A great many of the Poles who had come to Silesia had done so because, in the first years after the war, Silesia was something of a Klondike for them. Now, when opportunities in Silesia were no better than elsewhere in Poland, the private Poles there were less interested in the area. The native Upper Silesians approved of United States support for West German rearmament. The Poles of source's acquaintance accepted it, but not enthusiastically. For the Poles, Communism and German rearmament were both evils, but as Communism was so much greater an evil, German rearmament was accepted as something which might eventually contribute to the liberation of Poland from Soviet rule. The argument that German rearmament might bring war nearer was not of much importance. A great many people felt that, since no peaceful solution of their problem was in sight, even war would be better than an indefinite continuation of Communist tyranny.

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10. [redacted] but he was certain that the changes in Moscow left people in Poland indifferent. For the Poles, it made no difference who was running the government in Moscow. Nobody expected internal changes in the Soviet Union to make life any better for the people of Poland or even for the people of Russia, for that matter. The United States was thought to be stronger than the USSR but the Soviet possession of the hydrogen bomb was seen as evening up the forces of the two powers. People supposed that the issue would eventually have to be settled by a war. They did not think the war very likely within the next few years, as the Soviet Union was probably not yet ready for it, but come it would. There was, therefore, a general feeling that time was on the side of the Soviets, a feeling which increased the dissatisfaction felt in Poland toward America's foreign policy. "What is America waiting for?" was a commonly heard remark.

Hooliganism and Youth Attitudes:

1. Source did not have much direct and intimate contact with young people. He tended to be pessimistic about the influence of Communist propaganda on the young people, but admitted that to date the young people were still overwhelmingly anti-Communist. In some respects, indeed, the youth was more actively anti-Communist than the older generation. Young people were not quite so resigned to the hopelessness of their situation as the older people were. In source's opinion, however, this was only because the young people saw things more superficially than did their elders.
2. Hooliganism, used as a general term for drunkenness and disorderly behaviour in public, was a serious problem but not one which the public felt very strongly about. People generally recognized that hooliganism was a result of the Communist social and economic situation. Life in Poland was dull and disagreeable. Drinking made it less so. The public also tolerated hooliganism because everyone knew that youth had to sow its wild oats.
3. As for the so-called hooligans themselves, source did not think that their behaviour was politically motivated. Doubtless some were aware that the wearing of supposedly western-style clothing was an indirect form of political demonstration, but many more

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were probably mainly interested in impressing their girl friends. Source did not think that juvenile delinquency was increasing, but it was not being reduced either. [redacted] he saw little difference in the behaviour of young workers and old. The rate of absenteeism was about the same for all age groups. The amount of thievery practiced by young workers was the same as that practiced by the older. He did not think that there was, as yet, any significant group of "gilded youth" in Poland responsible for a disproportionate share of juvenile misbehaviour.

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Religion

14. Source was pessimistic about the outlook for religion in Poland. The triumph of the Communists had shattered the religious beliefs of many people, not so much as a result of Communist propaganda as a consequence of the evident victory for the forces of evil represented by Communist rule. More people went to church now, but this was more as a political protest against Communism than because more people had become really religious. The clergy tended each year to become more passive and submissive. The Communists were not winning over the clergy anymore than they were winning over any substantial part of the population. They were succeeding, however, in changing the clergy into only another malleable instrument for the diffusion of Communist propaganda on such selected themes as the need for peace, obedience to the civil authorities, and the like. Source, [redacted] based his conclusions on discussions he had had with a brother-in-law who had worked in a provincial government office concerned with organizing district meetings of the priests. These meetings were held every two or three weeks and were used by Party officials to lay down the general lines which had to be followed in sermons on the following Sundays.

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Economic Planning Priorities:

15. [redacted] but he recalled that the 1954 plan for the works had called for processing some 160,000 tons of steel. As of the end of September, 119,000 tons had been worked. Preliminary work on the plan for 1955 was started in September 1954. The factory's version of the plan, providing for an increase in output with existing equipment and manpower of only three per cent over the 1954 plan figure, was sent to Warsaw at the end of October 1954. At the end of November 1954, this document was disapproved by the Ministry and returned to the plant with instructions to revise it upwards to provide for an increase in output of up to 15 per cent with the same equipment and manpower. When the factory management replied that this was impossible, the Ministry insisted that, if proper account were taken of technical progress, some sizeable increase in production should nevertheless be possible. [redacted] the question had not been finally resolved, but it was certain that the protests of the factory director and his technical staff would be overruled. The final figure spoken of for increased output in 1955 was on the order of eight or ten per cent above the 1954 plan.

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16. [redacted] the government's efforts to divert labor to agriculture had never been very serious. [redacted] there was a campaign to persuade workers with farming backgrounds to transfer to the State Farms, but of the approximately 8,400 employees at the works, fewer than 20 workmen made the shift. The campaign failed because, in source's opinion, the organization section of the plant did little or nothing to help it succeed. The whole action was left to the unassisted and amateurish efforts of the youth organization (ZMP).

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7. [redacted] a similar but more earnest effort was made to obtain labor for the mines. Party activists, working quietly by approaching individuals instead of making public speeches, managed to persuade some twenty or thirty employees of the [redacted] to take jobs in the coal mines, and to oblige another 170 or 180 to accept such transfers. The factory planned to send a recruiting team to eastern Poland to obtain unskilled farm labor as replacements for the men shifted to the mines.

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Consumers Goods Production and the New Course:

18. Source said that hardly anyone in Poland had any expectation that living conditions would improve in the next years. At the beginning of the present Six-Year-Plan in 1949-50, there had been some hope that the standard of living would eventually rise, but since 1952 most people have taken it for granted that Communist promises about a better standard of living were as worthless as Communist promises on other subjects. The occasional price cuts were a fraud, and generally recognized as such. Prices were cut in public, and later raised in silence. In the [] for example, [] several dozen cans of fruit preserves. The grocery had received word that the prices for these would be increased the next day. Such price raises for one item or another were an almost weekly happening in the store, []. For this reason, source believed that the standard of living at the [] was actually lower than it had been a year earlier. Moreover, the decline was continuing. 50X1 50X1
19. The talk about increasing the output of consumers' goods had not been very seriously meant. [] an order was received from the Ministry of Metallurgy to set up a separate department to manufacture small metal items such as knives, scissors, and the like on a side-line basis. This was to have begun [] thereupon wrote to Warsaw to ask if he would receive financial assistance in getting this production under way and if he would be allocated additional labor. The Ministry replied that no approval would be given for hiring additional employees, and that no help would be advanced to finance the initial stages of such production. Labor should be obtained from the other departments of the works, and the new production should be financed out of the existing works' budget until it became self-supporting, the Ministry stated. Since the Ministry's original instruction had said nothing about which items should be manufactured, or how large the separate department should be, the officials in the factory concluded that Warsaw was not really in earnest in issuing instructions for this side-line consumers' goods production. This was the end of the discussion of plans for setting up a special department for the output of consumers' goods. 50X1 50X1
20. There had, of course, always been a small amount of side-line production of consumers' goods [] but even this had increased little in the last two years. Engineers in the factory designed and made a very attractive, small, many-bladed, pocket knife in the [] for possible manufacture as a side-line item. The factory director, [] had asked the provincial authorities in Stalinogrod (Katowice) at what price the knife should be sold. The factory had proposed to sell the knife for about 15 zlotys, and thought that it could be retailed for 20 zlotys. The provincial officials said the knife should retail for at least 50 zlotys. [] the works director had refused to produce the knife unless more of the profit would go to the factory instead of to the retail trading organization. Since the provincial officials had not given in, no knives were being made. Source added, however, that this particular difficulty may have been the result of bad blood which existed for quite some time between the works director and the Party authorities in Stalinogrod. The latter had written some criticism of Farnik in the local [] but as Farnik had the strong support of the Minister for Metallurgy, Eng. Kiejstut Zemaajtis, in Warsaw, he had held his own in the fight. 50X1 50X1
21. Ideological considerations prevented the Communists from making any significant concessions to private enterprise, despite the economic need for such concessions. In the [] for example, the State Investment Bank at Stalinogrod sent a report to Warsaw stating that the state trading organizations in the province would not be able to supply all of the consumers' goods needed in the province. The bank suggested that the situation might be alleviated if more small private shops were allowed to reopen and to deal in the scarce items, in particular in electrical goods (plugs, cords, and the like). The suggestion, carefully phrased to eliminate suspicions that its proponents were ideological backsliders, was that some 750 retail shops should be allowed to reopen in the province. Source did not know how this number 50X1

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compared to the total of private shops still in existence, but said that in the county of Stalinogrod the proposal had been that 200 shops be opened alongside an existing total of from 100 to 150 private shops. The bank officials who put forward the scheme did not ask themselves where such newly opened shops would obtain the supplies they would sell, but more or less took it for granted that private initiative would find sources of supply the state could not reach. Warsaw vetoed the proposal.

Wage Levels:

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In the [redacted] per month. Taxes and other compulsory deductions took about one hundred zlotys per month. In the [redacted] his gross earnings amounted to a little over [redacted] per month, and his net to about 1,800. His base pay in the [redacted] but there was a 100 per cent premium on top of this whenever the tonnage output of the plant was 100 per cent of the plan. The premium was smaller if the output was lower. If production was less than 90 per cent of plan, no premium at all was paid. In addition to the premium, there was an allowance during the winter of 135 zlotys per month in lieu of a special coal ration. Seventy per cent of the clerical workers received the premia on the grounds that they were technicians. The clerical employees who did not receive the premia were thus the worst-paid workers in the plant even though their base pay rates tended to be higher than those of the production workers. All of the latter received a premium, though the size of the premium depended on their qualifications. Unskilled production workers were limited to a maximum premium of 75 per cent of the base pay.

According to a new wage law of [redacted] premia would be cut in the future by linking their size to the financial results of the factory's operations as well as, or perhaps instead of, to the physical output results. It was said that this would also be applied to the wages of the clerical staff, i.e., to the non-production workers. It was suggested that if they felt discriminated against they had the remedy of transferring to productive work. All of this amounted to a cut in wages, since the raising of the output figures in [redacted] made it less likely that the same percentage premia could be earned under the new plan as had been possible under the previous one.

24. Source was not familiar with details on the wages or living standards of other groups in the country. He was sure that the high Party leaders in Warsaw lived very well, but Party leaders elsewhere were not nearly so well off. City people complained that the peasants were better off than townspeople, but source did not think that this was necessarily true. The only firm generalization he cared to make was that white-collar workers were very poorly off indeed.

Sabotage and Theft in Polish Industry:

25. Source thought that there was hardly any sabotage now being practiced in Poland. There were frequent accidents and break-downs [redacted] which the police almost always investigated to determine whether sabotage may have been present, but he never saw any proof that sabotage had actually been practiced. The security officials always tried to find someone to blame whenever anything went wrong, but the local plant officials generally tried to protect their employees, if necessary by shifting the blame for an accident to faulty equipment supplied by another factory. Source had the impression that since the [redacted] the police themselves had made fewer arrests in such cases than formerly. [redacted] there were no cases in which technicians were arrested. Occasionally a workman would come to work drunk, would start a fight with a foreman, and would thereafter disappear, presumably into the custody of the police.

26. At all stages of production, however, there reigned what source called "unlimited carelessness" (grenzenlose Nachlaessigkeit). Nobody cared what happened to a machine or a product so long as he could not be held personally responsible for its

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loss. Nor did anybody care how much state property was stolen, so that losses from thefts were enormous. As an example of this, source cited the disappearance in one day of some 50 kilograms of a 500 kilogram consignment of copper the [] had just received for processing from another factory. The thieves were never found, though it was evident to everyone that probably all of the workers handling the metal had shared in the filching of the copper. Such stolen metal was usually sold by the workmen (directly or through middlemen) to private craftsmen and others who made small metal objects at home in their spare time. This form of non-political "economic sabotage" was so well-organized that one small team of three or four workmen on the night shift made a regular practice of producing and smuggling out of the factory for resale to middlemen large quantities of small metal magnets to be used in electric guitars. In this instance, it was even possible that another state enterprise, the one making guitars, was the eventual purchaser of the illegally produced magnets. The authorities made great efforts to suppress such thievery, but the traffic was so profitable, and so many people took part in it, that there was perhaps more thievery now than ever before.

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893.31	55M
890.4	55M
890.5	55M
107.4	55M
783.301	55M
769	55M
781.13	55M
762.203	55M
124.13	55M(N)
124.13	N(PM)
4-5/733.4	55M
8-11/733.4	55M
9/740.1	55M

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